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A large number of studies have attempted to determine whether managers of equity mutual funds
are able to consistently earn positive risk-adjusted returns. Although the ability of at least some
managers to earn abnormal returns is still debated,1 these studies have documented significant
differences in risk-adjusted returns across funds. It became apparent early on (Sharpe, 1966),
however, that those differences are to a large extent attributable to differences in fund expenses:2
fund returns are reported net of expenses, and differences in expenses explain most of the variation
in after-expense performance (Carhart, 1997).
Even though the well-documented ability of fees to explain cross-sectional differences in after-fee
performance lends support to the hypothesis of an efficient stock market, it also implies that the
mutual fund market is informationally inefficient. Somewhat surprisingly, however, most research
has been aimed at analyzing whether the remaining cross-sectional variation in performance can be
explained by the existence of managers with superior stock-picking skills (see, for instance, Chevalier
and Ellison, 1999), while very little effort has been devoted to understanding the fee-performance
relation. Given the key role played by the mutual fund market within the financial system,3
investigating the efficiency of the price mechanism in this market is of paramount importance. In
this paper, we undertake this task by exploring the relation between fees and before-fee performance
in the equity mutual fund industry.
In a well-functioning market, fees would adjust to ensure that, in equilibrium, after-fee perfor-
mance is equalized across funds. Therefore, in equilibrium, differences in fees would equal differences
in before-fee performance, so the slope of a regression of before-fee performance on fees would be
one. If fees adjusted only partially to differences in performance, that slope would be positive but
less than one. In contrast to this prediction, we find a puzzling negative relation between before-fee
performance and fees in a sample of diversified U.S. equity mutual funds: funds with worse before-
expense performance charge higher expenses. In an oft-cited article, Gruber (1996) drew attention
to the puzzle that investors buy actively managed funds even though, on average, they provide
lower after-fee risk-adjusted returns than index funds. Our results uncover yet another puzzling
fact about the industry of actively managed mutual funds.
There are several reasons, however, why our initial estimate may not reflect the true relation
between before-fee performance and fees. First, our dataset includes both actively managed funds
and index funds. Since it is well known that index funds are cheaper than actively managed funds
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and that, on average, the former outperform the latter, our results could be due to the presence of
index funds in the sample. The puzzle of a negative relation between before-fee performance and
expenses would thus reduce to the one identified by Gruber (1996). A similar problem may arise
because the dataset contains both funds sold to individual investors and funds that are sold only to
institutional investors. Second, the estimated negative relation may be due to a mismeasurement
of the fees effectively paid by investors. In our initial estimation—as in most of the work on fund
performance—we implicitly assume that expenses are the only fees paid by investors. Taking into
account other fees that are often paid by investors could eliminate the negative relation if those
fees tend to be lower in funds that charge higher expenses. A third problem is that the sign of the
coefficient could be determined by the influence of expensive underperforming funds, which manage
just a small fraction of investors’ money and may be short-lived. Finally, the result may be explained
by differences between subsectors within the market for actively managed mutual funds. If funds
with different investment objectives are not regarded as substitutes by investors, our results could
be consistent with a positive relation between fees and before-fee performance within subsectors.
Controlling for all these potential problems, however, we find that the negative relation between
before-fee performance and fees persists. We then set out to explain this anomalous relation by
investigating the role of funds’ performance in the determination of fund fees.
We consider two related hypotheses, which assume that investors differ in their sensitivity to
performance. According to the first hypothesis, advanced by Christoffersen and Musto (2002) in
the context of money market mutual funds, mutual fund managers set fees taking into account the
elasticity of the demand for their shares, so that funds facing less elastic investors charge higher
fees. Christoffersen and Musto (2002) argue that funds with worse past performance will face a
less elastic demand, since the performance-sensitive investors would have left the fund following
bad past performance. If performance is persistent for at least the worse-performing funds (as
indicated by Carhart, 1997), this could explain our finding of a negative relation between fees
and before-fee performance. An alternative hypothesis, proposed recently by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-
Verdu´ (2005), is that fund managers with different abilities target different segments of investors.
These authors argue that competition among high-ability managers for the money of sophisticated
(performance-sensitive) investors will push their fees down and drive the worse-performing funds
out of that segment of the market. The latter funds will then target unsophisticated investors,
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to whom they are able to charge higher fees. According to this explanation, the reason why
underperforming funds charge higher fees is not that their shares are held by unsophisticated
investors. Rather, underperforming funds are avoided by sophisticated investors because of their
high fees, so they end up in the hands of unsophisticated investors. We test these two hypotheses
against an alternative cost-based explanation. According to this explanation, fund characteristics
not included in the univariate regression might be associated with both lower management costs
and better performance. For instance, if fund size or age are positively correlated with performance
and they allow funds to charge lower fees because of scale or learning economies (see e.g., Malhotra
and McLeod, 1997), then the negative relation between performance and fees could simply be due
to the omission of these variables.
We test these hypotheses in two steps. Building on previous work on fund flows (Sirri and
Tufano, 1998; Jain and Wu, 2000; Nanda et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2006), in the first step, we
estimate a flow equation that relates fund flows to different fund characteristics. This allows us
to obtain for each fund an estimate of the sensitivity of its flows to performance, which we can
then include in an equation of mutual fund fee determination. In the second step, we regress
fees on funds’ performance, flow-performance sensitivity and a number of variables—including size
and age—that have been previously identified as determinants of funds’ operating costs. Our
results support the hypotheses of Chistoffersen and Musto (2002) and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´
(2005): funds faced with less sensitive investors charge higher fees, yet, even after controlling for
performance-sensitivity, funds with lower expected performance set higher fees.
Our results carry important implications, both for individual investors, who are once again
reminded of the importance of carefully considering fund fees when making their investment deci-
sions, and, especially, for regulators. First, our results suggest that a significant fraction of investors
responds at best sluggishly to differences in after-fee performance. Second, a significant number of
funds exploit that fact and charge high fees. Finally, competition in the market for mutual funds,
while disciplining those funds who target sophisticated investors, has not been able to prevent funds
that cater to performance-insensitive investors from setting high fees nor to quickly drive them out
of the market.
The article is organized as follows. Section I characterizes the equilibrium in a well-functioning
mutual fund market; Section II describes the dataset and the different fees charged by mutual
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funds; Section III explains how we estimate fund performance; Section IV estimates the relation
between before-fee performance and fees and performs a number of tests to evaluate the robustness
of the results; Section V discusses several explanations for the estimated relation between fees and
performance and tests them; finally, Section VI concludes.
I. Mutual Fund Market Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the market equilibrium condition for a frictionless mutual fund market
and obtain an estimating equation to test that equilibrium condition.
In a frictionless mutual fund market, equilibrium can be derived using a standard arbitrage
argument. Suppose that asset returns in excess of the risk-free interest rate follow a K-factor
model and let RFt denote the vector of excess returns at time t of the corresponding K factor
portfolios. Then, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1976) states that, for no arbitrage
opportunities to exist, the returns in excess of the risk-free rate of any asset j must equal:
rjt = βjRFt + υjt, (1)
where βj is the vector of asset j’s exposures to the factors (factor loadings or betas) and υjt is a
zero-mean error term capturing idiosyncratic risk.
If we let αit denote the ability of fund i’s manager to generate before-fee returns above those
earned by any portfolio with identical exposure to the risk factors, then fund i’s before-fee return
in excess of the risk-free rate is given by:
rit = αit + βiRFt + υit (2)
Finally, defining αnit ≡ αit − fit as fund i’s net (or after-fee) alpha, fund i’s after-fee return in
excess of the risk-free rate can be expressed as:
nit = (αit − fit) + βiRFt + υit = αnit + βiRFt + υit (3)
An arbitrage argument then implies that if funds’ factor loadings and alphas are known, in
equilibrium all funds must have a zero after-fee alpha. To see this, suppose that there existed funds
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with positive after-fee alpha (αnit > 0) in a number sufficient to construct a diversified portfolio (if
we consider diversified mutual funds, it should not take a very large number of funds to diversify
the residual risk). Let αnpt denote the after-fee alpha of this portfolio and βp its vector of factor
loadings. Then, it would be possible to construct a zero-cost strategy by investing h dollars in
portfolio p and selling short h dollars of a portfolio containing the factor portfolios and the risk-
free asset with weights equal to βp and 1 − βpι, respectively, where ι is a K × 1 vector of ones.
The expected payoff of this strategy would equal hαnpt. Since α
n
pt is strictly positive, such strategy,
would approximate an arbitrage as the residual risk of the fund portfolio approaches zero. It follows
that there will always be excess demand for shares of mutual funds with positive after-fee alpha.
Since mutual fund shares cannot be sold short, a negative alpha would not constitute an arbitrage
opportunity. Investors, however, would avoid mutual funds with negative after-fee alpha, since they
would be better off investing in a diversified portfolio with the same factor loadings. Therefore,
market equilibrium in the market for mutual funds requires that fees adjust to make all after-fee
alphas equal to zero4 (αnit = αit − fit = 0), or, in terms of before-fee risk-adjusted returns:
αit = fit for all i. (4)
Therefore, in the absence of market frictions, equilibrium requires before-fee alphas and fees to be
positively and linearly related. Further, the slope of the linear relation has to be one.
In the presence of market frictions, such as short-selling or borrowing constraints, trading costs,
or costly search, there might be small and transitory deviations from condition (4), with some funds
offering small and negative after-fee alphas and others offering small and positive alphas. As long
as these deviations are not correlated with fund fees, before-fee performance and fees will be, as in
equation (4), linearly related and with a unitary slope.
Our first goal is to evaluate whether the relation between fees and before-fee performance
approximates the one-to-one equilibrium relation derived above. We estimate the following equation
to test our equilibrium condition:
α̂it = δ0t + δ1fit + ²it, (5)
where α̂it is our estimate of αit. In Section III, we discuss in greater detail how we estimate alpha.
Here, we only note that as long as the measurement error in α̂it is uncorrelated with fees, it will
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not introduce any bias in the estimation.
II. Data
A. Mutual Fund Fee Structure
Fund management fees are typically computed as a fixed percentage of the value of assets under
management.5 These fees, together with other operating costs—such as custody and administrative
fees —constitute the so-called fund’s expenses, which are deducted on a daily basis from the fund’s
net assets by the managing company. When expressed as a percentage of assets under management,
these expenses are known as the fund’s expense ratio. Thus, the expense ratio closely approximates
the notion of fund fee employed in Section I. Fees paid by fund management companies to brokers
in the course of the fund’s trading activity are detracted from the fund’s assets, but are not included
in the fund’s expense ratio.
On top of the expenses described above, fund investors are often charged one-time fees known
as loads, which are used to pay distributors. These loads are paid at the time of purchasing (sales
charge on purchases or front-end load) or redeeming fund shares (deferred sales charge or back-end
load) and are computed as a fraction of the amount invested.6 Although loads do not pay for fund
management services, they do contribute to the cost of acquiring fund shares. It is worth noting
that funds often waive at least a fraction of the loads. Therefore, the loads reported in the CRSP
database may often be higher than the ones actually paid by investors.
Further, since the 1980s, many funds charge so-called 12b-1 fees, which, like loads, are used
to pay for marketing and distribution costs, but, unlike loads, are not one-time fees, but, rather,
are included in the fund’s expense ratio. Since the 1990s, many funds have been offering multiple
share classes with different combinations of loads and 12b-1 fees. In particular, class A shares are
characterized by high front-end loads and low annual 12b-1 fees, while classes B and C typically
have no front-end loads but higher 12b-1 fees and a contingent deferred sales load, which decreases
over time. In the case of C shares, back-end loads only apply the first year, while for class B shares
back-end loads are reduced at a 1% annual rate. Class B shares are normally converted into class
A shares after a period of 6 to 8 years.
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B. Description of the Sample
We obtained our data from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database for the
period December 1961-December 2003 (see Carhart, 1997; Carhart et. al., 2002; and Elton et al.,
2001, for detailed discussions of the dataset). The initial sample contained all open-ended mutual
funds alive in the 1961-2003 period. From this initial sample, we excluded all funds that could not
be confidently described as diversified, domestic equity mutual funds. Thus, we removed money
market funds, bond and income funds, and specialty mutual funds, such as sector or international
funds. Although classifications vary throughout the period, the resulting funds can be broadly
described as growth or growth and income funds.
To obtain our sample of diversified domestic equity mutual funds, we used the information on
funds’ investment objectives available in the CRSP database. Unfortunately, this information is
not consistent throughout the 1961-2003 period. To address this problem, we combined all the
information available on funds’ investment objectives to create a homogeneous sample for the years
1961-2003 (see the appendix for details). Some of our results, however, are derived only for the
years 1992-2003, for which the information on funds’ investment objectives is precise and consistent.
From the sample of diversified equity mutual funds, we deleted observations with no information
on returns or expenses or with zero expenses. Inspection of the remaining sample showed that there
existed observations with values for expenses or returns that were either obvious errors or values
that could not have been generated by diversified equity mutual funds. For example, there were
observations reporting monthly returns of more than 300% or expenses of more than 40%. Given
the large size of the dataset, we searched for these outliers using Hadi’s (1994) outlier detection
method.7
Table I contains summary statistics for our final sample of 538,813 fund-month observations.
The mean expense ratio for the whole sample is 1.37 percentage points, with a standard deviation
of 0.61. Figure 1 displays the time-series variation of average fees during the sample period, and
reveals two facts. First, expense ratios have smoothly grown throughout the sample period (with
average expenses increasing from 0.78 in 1962 to 1.5 in 2003), with growth in the late 1980s and
1990s attributable to the introduction of 12b-1 fees. Second, average loads, despite changing little
for the first twenty years of the sample, experienced a significant drop in the 1980s, levelling off
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by the mid-1990s. To assess the cross-sectional variation in fees, we have also computed standard
deviations and coefficients of variation by year (not reported). For expenses, these coefficients of
variation average 0.42 over the whole sample with little variation over time. The dispersion in loads
(measured by the coefficient of variation), in contrast, has increased over time, even if we restrict
attention to funds charging positive loads.
It is interesting to evaluate Figure 1 in the light of Figures 2 and 3. These figures display the
dramatic growth of the market for equity mutual funds both as measured by total net assets and
by the number of funds. While in year 1962, there were 110 diversified equity mutual funds in our
sample, this number had grown to 671 by 1990 and to 5,613 (2,295 if all share classes of a given
fund—coded by CRSP as different funds—are counted as one fund) by 2003.8 Therefore, it seems
that, although the large growth in the number of funds may have led to a reduction in loads, it has
not reduced fund expenses.
III. Mutual Fund Performance Estimation
To estimate the equilibrium equation (5), we first estimate fund performance. Following a long
list of studies in the mutual fund performance evaluation literature, we employ Carhart’s (1997)
model to measure risk-adjusted mutual fund returns.9 In order to evaluate the robustness of our
results, we also use Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. In either case, we follow Carhart’s
(1997) two-stage estimating procedure.10 In the first stage, we estimate every month each fund’s
exposure to risk factors (betas) over the previous five years. If less than five years of previous
data are available for a specific fund-month, we require that the fund has been active for at least
48 months in the previous five years, and then use the available data to estimate its betas. In
particular, factor exposures are estimated as the slope coefficients in the OLS regressions:
ris = βFF0,it + β
FF
rm,itrms + β
FF
smb,itsmbs + β
FF
hml,ithmls + ε
FF
is (FF)
ris = βC0,it + β
C
rm,itrms + β
C
smb,itsmbs + β
C
hml,ithmls + β
C
pr1y,itpr1ys + ε
C
is, (C)
where the first equation estimates factor exposures according to Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model, and the second one estimates factor exposures according to Carhart’s (1997) model.
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In both expressions, ris is fund i’s before-expense return11 in month s (s = t− 60, t− 59, . . . , t− 1)
in excess of the risk-free interest rate proxied by the 3-month T-Bill secondary market rate; rms
is the market portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate; and smbs, hmls, pr1ys, denote the
return on portfolios which proxy for common risk factors associated with size, book-to-market and
momentum effects.12
In the second stage, we estimate performance as the difference between before-expense returns
and model-implied returns given the fund’s estimated exposure to risk factors:
αˆFFit ≡ rit − βˆFFrm,itrmt − βˆFFsmb,itsmbt − βˆFFhml,ithmlt (6)
αˆCit ≡ rit − βˆCrm,itrmt − βˆCsmb,itsmbt − βˆChml,ithmlt − βˆCpr1y,itpr1yt (7)
This two-stage procedure yields a total of 207,968 monthly risk-adjusted before-expense returns
corresponding to 3,146 different funds through 444 months. While the annualized average monthly
return before expenses equals 10.17%, subtracting the risk-free rate and the part of fund returns
explained by the portfolio’s exposure to Fama-French three factors yields an annualized average
monthly alpha of 9 basis points (bp), which is further reduced to −87 bp when momentum is
taken into account. The corresponding annualized standard deviations are 19.72%, 8%, and 7.92%,
respectively.
IV. A Test of the Equilibrium Predictions
In this section, we investigate whether the relation between fund performance and fees is as
predicted by the market equilibrium equation (4). To do so, we first estimate the relation between
mutual fund performance and expense ratios for our whole sample and then conduct a number of
tests to check the robustness of the results.
A. The Relation between Performance and Fund Expenses
We first estimate equation (5) using the expense ratio as our measure of mutual fund fees.
A test of the equilibrium relation between mutual fund fees and performance can be carried out
by regressing performance on expenses—as specified in equation (5)—or, alternatively, by running
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a regression of expense ratios on fund performance. We opt for the former approach for two
reasons. The first reason has to do with comparability of results, since a number of studies have
regressed different measures of performance—typically net of expenses—on expense ratios (e.g.,
Carhart, 1997; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). The second reason has to do with the statistical
properties of the coefficient estimates. Since funds’ true alphas are not observed, estimated alphas
are used instead, so our measure of fund performance contains a significant amount of measurement
error. Therefore, if performance is included as a regressor, its estimated coefficient will be biased
towards zero because of the attenuation bias induced by measurement error. Regressing estimated
performance on expenses (for which we expect measurement error to be much smaller), however,
yields an unbiased estimate (Levi, 1973).
Our regression equation is, therefore:
α̂it = δ0t + δ1fit + ξit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , Ti (8)
where fit stands for the fund’s expense ratio, and the intercept is allowed to vary over time to adjust
for cross-sectional correlation of residuals. We estimate the model coefficients by pooled OLS and
compute White’s heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by time.13 It is worth noting
that reported standard errors are higher than OLS standard errors and, more generally, higher
than standard errors computed without accounting for cross-sectional correlation of residuals across
funds. Therefore, our tests for the significance of coefficient estimates will tend to be conservative.
Table II reports regression results estimated using the whole sample of diversified equity funds.
When alpha is measured according to the Fama-French three-factor model, the estimated regression
coefficient is both negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. In particular, investing
in a fund with a one percent higher annual expense ratio reduces expected annual alpha before
expenses by 62 bp. The negative relation between fees and before-fee performance is even more
severe when the momentum factor is taken into account, that is, when performance is measured
according to the four-factor model. In the latter case, funds with expense ratios one percent above
average can be expected to earn a risk-adjusted return before expenses one percent below that of
the mean fund. This effect is significant at the 1% level.
We have checked whether the results in Table II are robust both to the number of monthly
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periods used for estimating fund betas and to the number of periods over which subsequent perfor-
mance is measured. More specifically, we have run time series regressions using returns from the
previous three years (at least 30 months of data were required). We have also aggregated alphas
and expenses over the subsequent 3, 6, 12, and 24 months. In all cases, we obtain similar results
both in terms of estimated coefficients and standard errors.14
The results in Table II are inconsistent with the predictions of the model sketched in Section
I. Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that the market for equity mutual funds resembles a
frictionless competitive market in which net performance is equalized across funds in equilibrium.
To understand the significance of the results on Table II, it is important to note that, once
we depart from the competitive benchmark, it is not clear whether we should a priori expect δ1
to be greater or smaller than one. Thus, it seems plausible that, in the presence of costly search
or other market imperfections, better funds may charge higher fees (δ1 > 0), but that those fees
may not be high enough to fully compensate for differences in before-fee performance. In this
scenario, funds with higher fees would offer a higher after-fee performance and the estimated δ1
would be greater than one (δ1 > 1 implies that increases in fees are matched by larger increases in
before-fee performance). It is, however, also plausible that better funds may overcharge for their
ability to generate returns, leading to differences in fees that exceed differences in performance and
to an estimated δ1 ∈ (0, 1). In this scenario, funds with higher fees would exhibit better before-
fee performance but worse after-fee performance. An extreme version of this hypothesis is the
possibility that fees are completely unrelated to funds’ before-fee performance, leading to δ1 = 0.
The estimated negative δ1 in Table II, however, suggests an a priori much less plausible scenario
in which before-fee performance is decreasing in fees, or, in other words, a scenario in which
funds with worse before-fee performance charge higher fees. Surprisingly, this unexpected relation
has been largely overlooked by the vast literature on mutual fund performance, as have been its
implications regarding the functioning of the mutual fund market.
B. Is There Really a Negative Relation between Before-Fee Performance and Fees?
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of the estimated negative relation between perfor-
mance and fees. In particular, we examine the possibility that it may be due to different sample
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selection problems or to an incorrect measurement of the actual price paid by investors.
B.1. Index and Institutional Funds
Gruber (1996) shows that, on average, actively-managed funds underperform passively-managed
index funds. Since index funds tend to charge lower fees, the apparent puzzle of a negative relation
between fees and performance might be explained away by the better-known puzzle identified by
Gruber (1996). In other words, fees could adjust to equalize after-fee returns among actively-
managed funds, yet a negative relation between fees and before-fee performance could emerge
because of investors’ preference for actively-managed funds, which are more expensive and have
a worse performance than index funds. In fact, in our sample, the annualized average monthly
Carhart’s alpha for index retail funds was -27 bp with an average expense ratio of 83 bp. This
is in contrast to actively managed retail funds that delivered, on average, an annualized monthly
before-expense alpha of -85 bp and had expenses of 1.46 percent. A similar argument could apply to
funds sold to institutional investors. If these investors are more knowledgeable and have a greater
bargaining power, it is conceivable that institutional funds may yield better performance and at
a lower price. To assess these explanations, we reestimate equation (8) for the sample of retail
actively-managed funds that remains after we remove both institutional and passively managed
from the initial sample. As Table III shows, the estimated relation between fees and performance
is still negative and highly significant for this sample. In fact, the estimated regression coefficients
are marginally higher for both the three-factor and four-factor models. Therefore, the negative
relation between fees and performance is not due to the influence of index or institutional funds.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we nonetheless focus on actively managed retail funds to avoid
any potential confounding effects of the presence of index and institutional funds.
B.2. Small and Young Funds
Another source of concern is the possibility that our results are due to the influence of funds with
negligible market share, which may exhibit both low performance and high fees. Our requirement
that funds have at least 48 months of return information to be included in the sample, however,
already filters out the effect of unsuccessful funds that are terminated before reaching that threshold.
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To ensure that our results are not driven by small funds which have survived for at least 5 years,
we reestimate equation (8) for three different samples that exclude those fund-month observations
with assets under management in the first decile, first and second deciles, and three first deciles
of each corresponding month, respectively. Table IV shows that the negative relation between
expense ratios and performance holds also for the funds with a large amount of assets under
management, although the relation is not statistically significant for the measure of performance
based on the three-factor model. The difference between the results obtained for the three- and
four-factor models suggests that more expensive funds exhibit, on average, a greater exposure to
the momentum factor.
It is worth noting that the requirement that funds have at least 48 months of return information
to be included in the sample, while eliminating potential distortions due to short-lived, unsuccessful
funds, also limits the representativeness of the results to the subset of seasoned funds. Although
we have also estimated risk-adjusted returns using only 30 months of return information and have
obtained similar results, our empirical strategy does not allow us to generalize our conclusions to
the whole population of equity mutual funds. We take this as a limitation of our results, but do
not attempt to extend the analysis to the youngest funds because of known problems with the data
for these funds. First, Elton et al. (2001) have cautioned about the accuracy of return information
for small funds. More importantly, Elton et al. (2001) have also documented a selection bias
in the CRSP database, which they label omission bias: these authors highlight that a significant
fraction of small funds do not have monthly information on returns and they estimate that funds
with reported returns outperform those that do not report returns. Since a large fraction of young
funds in our sample are also small, and since the omission bias may be especially acute for young
funds,15 including young funds with return information in the analysis would introduce a selection
bias, which could be problematic since young funds tend to charge higher expenses. Inspection of
our dataset indeed shows that selection may be an issue for young funds, since a large fraction of
observations for these funds do not include information on returns or expenses, with the incidence
of omitted information being specially large for the earlier years of the sample.16
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B.3. Other Fund Fees
So far, we have considered expense ratios as the only explicit cost of delegated portfolio manage-
ment. As discussed in Section II, however, investors often pay other fees at the time of purchasing
and/or redeeming their mutual fund shares. Hence, the previous regressions could be capturing a
negative relation between performance and a specific component of total fund share ownership cost,
but not necessarily a negative relation between performance and the total fees paid by investors. In
particular, if more expensive funds (when only expenses are considered) charged lower loads, then
after-fee performance (when all fees are considered) could still be equalized across funds. One way
to circumvent this problem is to focus on no-load funds exclusively, for which annual operating ex-
penses account for 100% of all fees. In Table V, we run the regressions for no-load funds only, which
implies that about two thirds of all observations are lost. For the three-factor model, although the
estimated coefficient is similar to that found above, the relation is no longer statistically significant.
For the four-factor measure of performance, however, we can safely assert that performance and
fees are negatively related in the no-load segment of the market.
Since load funds constitute the majority of the market, we also attempt to estimate the relation
between performance and a measure of total fund share ownership cost for these funds. Following
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and a large number of other studies, we compute the total annual ownership
cost by adding annual expense ratios to total loads divided by the number of years investors keep
their money in the fund, which we denote by τ . Although it has become common in the literature
to set τ = 7, redemption rates for equity funds in the period 1985-2003, suggest a shorter average
holding period in the range of 2.5 to 5 years.17 We remain agnostic about τ and perform the
analysis for τ = 2, 7, and 10 years. As seen in Table VI, higher total ownership cost is negatively
and significantly associated with before-fee performance for all the holding periods considered.
B.4. Analysis by Subperiod and by Investment Objective
To assess the temporal stability of the estimated relation between fees and performance, we
divided the sample into four periods and estimated equation (5) separately for each one. As Table
VII shows, the relation between the four-factor alpha and expenses is negative in all subperiods,
although not significantly different from zero in the 1967-1976 period. When performance is esti-
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mated using the three-factor model, the coefficient for expenses is negative and significant in the last
two periods, but it is not significantly different from zero in the periods 1967-1976 and 1977-1985.
Differences in results between the two measures of performance again suggest that more expensive
funds have on average a greater exposure to the momentum factor.
As a final test of the robustness of our results, we divide the sample into subsamples according to
funds’ stated investment objective and run separate regressions for each subsample. The rationale
for this strategy is that, if the mutual fund market is segmented, then certain investment objectives
could exhibit both higher average fees and lower average performance while still attracting the
money of investors who opt for that investment strategy. This could lead to a negative relation
between fees and performance and, at the same time, be compatible with equilibrium if investors
differed in their preferences over the different investment objectives (for example if they were limited
in their ability to diversify). Market segmentation could also arise if investors made investment
decisions sequentially by choosing first an investment objective and then a specific mutual fund
within that objective.
For the 1992-2003 period (for which the classification is detailed and consistent), we divide the
sample into subsamples according to the fund’s Strategic Insight objective code as reported by
CRSP, and then run the regression for each subsample. As shown in Table VIII, expense ratios
are negatively related to performance in all five investment objectives, although the relation is not
statistically significant for Growth MidCap and Small Company Growth funds. Replacing expense
ratios with total ownership cost with τ = 2, 7, and 10 years, produces results similar to those of
Tables VII and VIII (not reported).
V. Explaining the Puzzle
A. Cost-Based Explanations
We consider two different kinds of explanations for the negative relation between before-fee
performance and fees, which differ in their assumptions regarding mutual funds’ pricing behavior.
According to the first type of explanation, fees reflect funds’ costs of operating the fund. If low
costs were associated with better before-fee performance, a univariate regression would result in a
negative relation between fees and performance.
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Although one may expect performance to be positively, rather than negatively, associated with
fund costs—if higher costs reflect larger investments in research tools or higher salaries to attract
more talented managers—, there are also plausible explanations for a negative correlation between
costs and performance. For instance, it is likely that there exist economies of scale in fund man-
agement. At the same time, a larger size could be associated with better performance if a fund’s
size reflects its past performance, and performance is persistent. Similarly, older funds may benefit
from learning economies, which may be passed on to investors in the form of lower fees. If fund
longevity were related to good performance—as would be the case if worse-performing funds were
more likely to close down—then, again, we could observe a negative relation between costs and
performance.18 Finally, some funds could just be run more efficiently than others, with the differ-
ences in the quality of fund management manifesting themselves both in terms of higher returns
and lower operating costs.
Therefore, the negative relation between before-fee risk-adjusted returns and fees that resulted
from the univariate analysis conducted in Section IV could simply be due to a failure to control for
funds’ operating costs.
B. Strategic-Pricing Explanations
The second type of explanation views the negative relation between before-fee performance
and fees as the result of strategic fee setting by mutual fund companies. The challenge for this
kind of hypothesis is to explain why fund managers with worse past or expected performance may
strategically decide to set high fees. A possible explanation has been proposed and empirically
tested for money market mutual funds by Christoffersen and Musto (2002). Christoffersen and
Musto (CM, hereafter) argue, on the basis of empirical studies on mutual fund investment flows
(e.g. Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and survey data on mutual fund investors’ behavior (Capon et al.,
1996; Alexander et al., 1997), that mutual fund investors differ in their performance sensitivity, with
some investors quickly moving their money in response to differences in performance and others
reacting much more sluggishly to those differences. Since the demand function (that relates the
demand for a fund’s shares to that fund’s fee and past performance) faced by a fund is likely to be
determined to a large extent by its current investors, the elasticity of that demand to performance
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is likely to be largely determined by the performance-sensitivity of the current investors of the
fund. Therefore, funds with a larger proportion of performance-insensitive investors will charge
higher fees, since for these funds the reduction in after-fee performance caused by an increase in
fees will not translate into a large flow of money out of the fund. Finally, CM argue that funds
with a worse performance track record will have a less performance-sensitive clientele, since the
performance-sensitive investors will have fled those funds following bad performance. It follows
that funds with bad past performance will find it optimal to charge higher fees. CM’s explanation
is testable: all that is needed is a measure of the performance-sensitivity of each fund’s flows, an
issue that we address in the next subsection.
A different strategic explanation for the negative relation between before-fee performance and
fees has been recently provided by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´ (2005)—GR, hereafter. Like CM, these
authors argue that there are performance-sensitive and performance-insensitive investors. Then,
they show that competition between funds for the money of performance-sensitive investors will
lead good-quality funds to lower their fees up to a point where they effectively price bad-quality
funds out of the performance-sensitive segment of the market. Unable to compete in that segment,
bad funds will raise their fees to extract rents from performance-insensitive investors. The reason
why good funds are able to price worse funds out of the market has to do with the way fund
managers are compensated. The revenues of mutual fund managers are typically determined as a
fraction of assets under management. Therefore, for any given fee (expressed as a fraction of asset
value), good fund managers, who will achieve a larger increase in the value of their assets, will earn
higher revenues. As a result, there exists a fee level at which good funds break even in expectation
while worse-performing funds incur an expected loss.
GR’s explanation for the negative relation between before-fee performance and fees differs from
the one provided by CM in that, rather than responding to past returns, funds’ fee strategies are
forward-looking: fund managers who expect to perform poorly set higher fees and, thus, end up
with the less performance-sensitive investors. This implies, in particular, that if we consider two
funds with similar clienteles (in terms of the performance sensitivity of investors), the one with
lower expected returns will set a higher fee. This prediction is also testable. What is needed
in this case is a measure of a fund’s risk-adjusted expected performance. Estimated alpha (αˆit)
will be a good measure of expected performance (αit), as long as the measurement error in αˆit is
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not correlated with the level of fees. If no such correlation exists, the result of including realized
performance, rather than expected performance, as a regressor in the fee equation reduces to the
well-known attenuation bias in the presence of measurement error. Thus, when interpreting the
performance coefficient estimates, one should bear in mind that they will be biased toward zero.
C. Empirical Strategy
To test the empirical validity of the different explanations for the negative relation between
before-fee performance and fees, we investigate how fees vary with fund characteristics. To do so,
we assume that fund i’s fee at time t, fit, is a function F of: a) a vector xi = (xi1, . . . , xiK) of
variables that are likely to determine the fund’s operating costs; b) the performance-sensitivity of
the fund’s flows, Si; and c) the fund’s expected performance in period t, αit:19
fit = F (xit−1, Sit, αit) + νit, (9)
where νit is a generic error term. Since we are interested both in the total price paid by investors
and in the compensation of managerial skill, we perform regressions both for total cost of ownership
and for a measure of management fees defined below.
We build on the literature on the determinants of mutual fund fees,20 which has mostly consid-
ered fund fees as a reflection of operating costs, to select the variables that may influence the costs
of operating a fund. These variables are the following:
1. Size. Mutual fund management is likely to exhibit scale economies, since a significant fraction
of the costs of managing a fund are fixed. We include size squared in the regression to allow
for the possibility that funds may experience diseconomies of scale beyond a certain size. As
discussed above, fund size may also be correlated with fund quality.
2. Age. Costs may fall with age if there are learning economies in fund management. Age can
also be correlated with a fund’s quality because of learning economies or, simply, because
better funds are more likely to survive.
3. Complex size. Since there may be economies of scale at the management company level
(Malhotra and Mcleod, 1997; Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Latzko, 1999), we also include complex
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size in the regression. As with fund size, we also include the square of complex size to account
for the possibility of eventual diseconomies of scale.
4. Number of funds in complex. A higher number of funds to manage, holding total assets
constant, may increase total management costs due to the increase in resources needed to
manage additional funds.
5. Turnover. A high turnover may signal a management strategy that requires frequent trading,
with frequent trading, in turn, requiring greater management effort. Consistently with this
explanation, Chalmers et al. (2000) have found transaction costs to be positively correlated
with expense ratios. It is important to note that turnover has also a direct negative impact
on performance through increased transaction costs (which are directly deducted from asset
value). Controlling for turnover, thus, enables us to evaluate an alternative explanation to
the puzzle: funds that trade too much underperform and are more costly to manage.
6. Volatility. The volatility of a fund’s returns has also been proposed as a determinant of fund
management costs, with the presumption that greater volatility signals a greater difficulty
in managing the fund. As in the case of turnover, differences in volatility may also explain
differences in performance across funds. It has been documented that mutual funds lagging
behind their rivals tend to adopt riskier strategies (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Therefore,
the set of high-risk funds may contain a relatively large fraction of underperformers.
7. Investment objective. Different investment objectives may require different amounts of re-
search and oversight. For example, it is often argued that funds that pursue an aggressive
growth investment objective will be more costly to manage than those with a growth and
income objective. It is also plausible that investment opportunities may be associated with
different asset classes. We, thus, include investment objective dummies to account for poten-
tially different cost structures and different mean performance. As in Section IV, we classify
funds into investment objectives using the Strategic Insight objective code as reported by
CRSP.
8. Fee structure. Investors acquiring funds through brokers or financial advisers also have to bear
the cost of compensating those intermediaries. Therefore, we also include a dummy variable
19
to identify single-class load funds and dummies for the main share classes. We include these
dummies to correct for the potential distortions induced by employing a homogeneous holding
period for all funds when investors with different holding periods can be expected to select
different share classes.
D. The Performance Sensitivity of Fund Flows
The second main component of our fee equation is the performance sensitivity of a fund’s
flows. CM suggest that the performance sensitivity of a fund’s investors depends on the outflows
of money experienced by the fund in the past (attrition), with funds that have experienced the
largest outflows being left with the least performance-sensitive investors.21 Consistently with this
reasoning, CM propose the following measure of the elasticity of flows to performance:
Q/MAXit =
TNAit
MAXit
, (10)
where TNAit is fund i’s total net asset value at the beginning of period t and MAXit is the
maximum total net asset value of fund i in the time-span up to period t. Q/MAX measures asset
retention, so that 1−Q/MAX measures asset attrition.
Although Q/MAX is a sensible measure of flow-to-performance sensitivity, there are several
reasons why we need to control for other factors. First, this measure does not take into account
the direct effect of returns on changes in asset value. A low value of Q/MAX may not be due to
past outflows of money, but, rather, to recent low returns. Second, when Q < MAX, there may be
factors that both increase Q/MAX and reduce performance sensitivity. In particular, Huang et al.
(2006) have shown that variables that reduce investor participation costs (such as fund affiliation
with large families or the presence of a star in the fund’s family) are associated with larger net flows
of money. At the same time, the sensitivity of flows to performance in the high-performance range
is lower for funds with low participation costs. Thus, if a fund’s participation costs are reduced
because of, say, the appearance of a star fund in its family, Q/MAX may go up because of increased
net flows, while, at the same time, the performance sensitivity of the fund’s investors falls. Finally,
Q/MAX is sensitive to a fund’s age. Thus, funds alive during a period of high asset appreciation
will be more likely to have a larger value of MAXit (and a lower value of Q/MAX) in subsequent
20
periods than funds that were not alive during such a period.
Instead of taking Q/MAXit as a proxy for flow-to-performance sensitivity, we propose to ob-
tain a direct estimate of flow-to-performance sensitivity as a function of fund characteristics. We
proceed in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the coefficients of a model of money flows into
mutual funds based on extant studies of fund flows. In the second step, we obtain our measure of
performance sensitivity from the estimated coefficients and fund characteristics.
D.1. Determinants of Fund Flows
As customary, we define annual net flow to fund i in month t, Flowit, as the relative growth of
the fund’s total net assets (TNA) adjusted for returns net of expenses, Rnit:
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Flowit =
TNAit − TNAit−1(1 +Rnit)
TNAit−1
(11)
To estimate performance sensitivity, we propose a model for fund flow determination that
encompasses the main stylized facts that have emerged from the literature on fund flows:
1. Investors chase past performance, i.e., flows of money to mutual funds are positively related
to recent relative after-expense performance (see, among others, Gruber, 1996, and Sirri and
Tufano, 1998).
2. Flows also depend on other variables, such as fund size (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), fund age
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), fund expenses (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber et al., 2005),
total complex size (Nanda et al., 2005), lagged flows (Jain and Wu, 2001), and flows of money
to funds with the same investment objective (Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
3. Flow-to-performance sensitivity depends on fund age with flows being less sensitive to perfor-
mance for older funds (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Huang et al., 2006). We also test CM’s
hypothesis that Q/MAX increases the sensitivity of flows to performance.
4. The sensitivity of flows to performance is significantly higher for recent top performers, i.e., the
flow-to-performance function is convex (Ippolito, 1992; Gruber, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison,
1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
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5. For funds with low participation costs, flow-to-performance sensitivity is higher in the low
and medium performance range, and lower in the high performance range, i.e., the flow-
performance curve becomes less convex as participation costs decrease (Huang et al., 2006).
Consistently with these findings, we estimate the following regression equation:
Flowit = a0t +
J∑
j=1
ajxj,it−1 + b0Perfit−1 + b1Perfit−1rel ageit−1 +
+b2Perfit−1rel Q/MAXit−1 + aHIH,it−1 + bHPerfit−1IH,it−1 +
+aPCH IH,it−1PCit−1 + b
PC
H Perfit−1IH,it−1PCit−1 + ϕit, (12)
where ϕit stands for a generic error term. The proxy for past performance, Perfit−1, is the fund’s
four-factor alpha in year t− 1, net of expenses, and in excess of the mean performance of all funds
with the same investment objective in that year. IH,it is a dummy variable that equals one if Perfit
is among the top third of all funds with the same investment objective in year t. We include this
variable to allow for a convex relation between performance and flows. Variables rel ageit and
rel Q/MAXit are, respectively, the log of the fund’s age in years and the fund’s Q/MAX in excess
of the average of those variables for all observations in year t with the same investment objective
as fund i. Control variables, xj , j = 1, . . . , J, include: fund size and age; front-end load; 12b-1 fee;
non-marketing expenses; dummy variables for share classes; return volatility; total net asset value
for all funds under the same management company; lagged flows; total flows of money to all funds
with the same investment objective; and Q/MAX.
Variable PC is a proxy for participation costs. We consider two of the proxies proposed by
Huang et al. (2006): total assets managed by the company (in excess of the category’s average on
that year); and a dummy for the presence of a “star” fund managed by the management company.
More precisely, this dummy variable equals one for fund i if there is another fund managed by fund
i’s management company with performance in the top 5% of its category.23
Table IX shows estimated coefficients of equation (12). The table is largely consistent with
previous results. The positive and significant values of aH and bH show that top-performing funds
receive higher flows on average, and that flows into those funds are more sensitive to relative per-
formance, consistently with the extensively documented convexity of the flow-performance relation.
Lack of sensitivity of flows to past performance in the low performance range is also consistent with
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the existence of unsophisticated or disadvantaged investors (although see Lynch and Musto, 2003,
for an alternative interpretation of this lack of sensitivity consistent with investor rationality).
Larger funds grow relatively less, while being part of a large complex or belonging to a fast-
growing investment objective category leads to larger inflows of money. Regarding age, we find
that older funds tend to experience lower net flows and, as in previous studies, our estimation
results indicate that investors are less responsive to fund performance if the fund is older. Also in
line with prior studies, fund flows appear to be persistent. Consistently with Huang et al. (2006)
the flow-to-performance sensitivity among top performing funds decreases when fund investors face
lower participation costs, regardless of the proxy for participation costs employed. Finally, Table IX
also shows that high values of Q/MAX are significantly associated with higher flow-to-performance
sensitivity, supporting CM’s hypothesis that Q/MAX is associated with performance sensitivity.
D.2. Performance Sensitivity
Once we have estimated the coefficients in (12), we obtain our proxy for flow-to-performance
sensitivity as the first derivative of flow with respect to performance:
Sit =
∂Et−1(Flowit)
∂Perfit−1
=
= bˆ0 + bˆ1rel ageit + bˆ2rel Q/MAXit + bˆHIH,it−1 + bˆPCH IH,it−1PCit−1 (13)
where Et−1(·) denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t − 1,
and the hats denote estimated coefficients.
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E. Performance, Operating Costs and Fund Fees
With the measure of performance sensitivity derived above, we estimate the following linear
specification of fee equation (9):
fit =γ0t + γ1sizeit−1 + γ2size2it−1 + γ3ageit−1 + γ4size complexit−1 + γ5size complex
2
it−1+
+ γ6n complexit−1 + γ7turnit−1 + γ8σit−1 + γ9classAit−1 + γ10classBit−1+
+ γ11classCit−1 +
4∑
j=1
λjobj
j
it−1 + γ12Sit + γ14α̂it + νit (14)
Since fee data are available yearly during most of the sample period, the time index t in equation
refers to calendar years (fee information is reported quarterly only for the last three years of the
sample). In equation (14), sizeit is defined as the log of fund i’s total net asset value averaged over
year t (starting in year 2000, total net assets are reported quarterly); age is the log of the fund’s
age in years; size complexit and n complexit are defined as the sum of size over all funds managed
by the management company that manages fund i, and the total number of funds managed by that
company, respectively; turnit is the reported portfolio turnover averaged over year t; and obj
j
it is
a dummy variable that takes value one if the fund’s investment objective is j. The performance
measure, α̂it, is the fund’s cumulative risk-adjusted return during year t, and is computed as the
sum of monthly alphas. Finally, σit is the standard deviation of the fund’s monthly returns in year
t. As in the estimation of fund flows, we restrict our analysis to the period 1992-2003.
Table X reports estimation results for different specifications of the fee equation (14). In columns
(1)-(2), the dependent variable is total ownership cost, computed assuming a holding period of 7
years, while in column (3), the dependent variable is management fees, defined as expenses net
of 12b-1 fees.24 For funds with a single share class, total ownership cost is computed by adding
annual expense ratios to total loads amortized with τ = 7. We also assume that for this holding
period, all class B and C shares are exempt from contingent deferred sales charges. Therefore, for
those shares we compute the total ownership cost as the sum of the expense ratio and the front-end
load amortized with τ = 7. Although it might be argued that investors with a holding period of 7
years will not consider investing in class A shares, we consider all share classes in the regression,
but control for differences in costs by including share class dummies. We also include a dummy
24
variable that equals one for load funds with a single share class. As in Section IV, we report pooled
OLS regression results with time dummies and standard errors clustered by time (year).
Results regarding those variables identified as determinants of funds’ operating costs are in line
with previous studies of mutual fund fees. Across all specifications of the fee equation, results
confirm the existence of economies of scale—both at the fund and management company levels—
in the management of mutual funds that are passed on to investors in the form of lower fees. The
negative coefficient for the square of size is also evidence that there may be diseconomies of scale
for large enough funds. Also consistently with previous evidence, both high portfolio turnover
and volatility are associated with higher total ownership cost. Finally, results also show significant
differences in fees across investment categories, withAggressive Growth funds (the excluded dummy)
being as much as 15 bp per year more expensive than the cheapest category: Growth and Income.
Taken together, these estimated coefficients suggest that operating costs play an important role in
determining fund fees.
Column (1) in Table X presents the results of estimating equation (14) without the performance-
sensitivity measure. If the negative relation between expected performance and fees were the
consequence of the omission of variables—such as size, age or turnover—that are likely both to
determine operating costs and to be related to performance, then we would expect the coefficient
of expected performance to change sign, or, at least, become statistically insignificant once these
variables are included in the regression. As column (1) shows, this is not the case: the coefficient for
expected performance remains negative and significantly different from zero. Cost-based arguments,
therefore, cannot explain why fees and performance are negatively related.
To evaluate the extent to which the effect of performance on fees operates through differences
in investors’ performance-sensitivity correlated with differences in performance, column (2) reports
the results of estimating the full model (14), which includes both performance and performance-
sensitivity as regressors.25 The results in column (2) show that performance sensitivity does have
a negative, and significant at any reasonable significance level, effect on fees, a result that sug-
gests that equity mutual funds strategically exploit a low elasticity of demand with respect to net
performance to increase their fees. Therefore, our results extend the findings of CM—which were
obtained for a cross-section of money market mutual funds—to the market for actively-managed
equity mutual funds, for a much larger sample, and with a more precise measure of performance
25
sensitivity.26 The inclusion of a measure of performance sensitivity, however, does not eliminate
the negative effect of expected performance on fees. On the contrary, the estimated coefficient in
column (2) is not only negative and statistically significant but higher (in absolute value) than the
one in column (1). In other words, elasticity of demand appears to be an important determinant
of fees, but does not by itself explain why underperforming funds set higher fees. Therefore, the
results lend support to the hypothesis that funds that expect to have a lower performance charge
higher fees.
The above results show that the shares of underperforming funds are more expensive. From this
finding, however, one cannot conclude that the managers of underperforming funds are being paid
more per dollar under management than the managers of better-performing funds. The reason is
that their higher cost could be due to the effect of distribution costs. To investigate the pricing of
fund management skills, we estimate equation (14) with management fees (measured as expenses
minus 12b-1 fees) as the fee variable. The results of this regression, reported in column (3) are
very similar to the ones obtained for total ownership cost. Therefore, our estimates indicate that
underperforming managers are charging a higher price for their fund management services than
better-performing ones.
A potential problem with our interpretation of the results in Table X is one of reverse causality.
Namely, the estimated coefficient may not reflect the effect of expected performance on current
fees, but, rather, the effect of current fees on expected performance. However, to the extent that
current fees have an effect on next year’s performance, we would expect this effect to be positive,
since higher fees increase the resources available to fund managers and, thus, can be expected to
generate higher returns. Therefore, if this sort of reverse causality is operating, we would expect it
to work against finding a negative coefficient for performance.
There is another reason why the results of Table X should be interpreted with care. Our finding
that funds setting higher fees have worse before-fee performance does not necessarily imply that
investors should avoid expensive funds, since the higher fees charged by those funds could be used
to offer services (such as investment advice, the provision of frequent and clear statements, or
the availability of agents that can respond to investors’ inquiries) that are valued by investors.
Therefore, our results could be due to a differentiation strategy by mutual fund companies, which
could target their better-performing funds to sophisticated investors and offer a bundle of lower
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performance and better service to investors who value that service more. Our data does not allow
us to reject this hypothesis, but there are indications that it may, at best, explain only part of the
differences in fees. First, the estimated coefficient for the fee-performance relation does not vary
substantially when we control for size and size of the management company, although we would
expect larger management companies to offer a higher level of service. And second, the size of
the coefficient is not reduced when we replace total ownership cost (which include fees that are
devoted to paying for the investment advice provided by brokers and other distribution costs) by
our management fee proxy in the regression.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we show that there exists a negative relation between funds’ before-fee per-
formance and the fees they charge to investors. Since this evidence is at odds with economic
intuition—and the predictions of a benchmark competitive model—we subject it to a battery of
robustness tests, and find that it survives all of them.
We then propose two kinds of explanations for this anomalous result. According to the first kind
of explanation, the negative relation is spurious and results from the fact that there are factors,
omitted in univariate regressions, that are both positively correlated with returns and negatively
correlated with funds’ operating costs and, thus, also with funds’ fees. According to the second
kind of explanation, in contrast, the negative relation is the result of funds’ strategically setting fees
as a function of their past or expected performance. In particular, we consider two rationales for
this kind of strategic behavior. The first one, proposed by Christoffersen and Musto (2002), argues
that funds with worse past performance have a pool of investors that are not very sensitive to fund
performance. Faced with an inelastic demand for their shares, underperforming funds optimally
increase fees. The second explanation, proposed by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´ (2005), argues that
funds with low expected performance optimally set high fees and target performance-insensitive
investors, since they anticipate that they will not be able to compete with better-performing funds
in the market for sophisticated investors. Better-performing funds, on the other hand, keep fees
low because of competition among them for the money of performance-sensitive investors. The
empirical analysis finds support for the two strategic-pricing explanations. Even though funds’
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operating costs are important determinants of fees, they do not explain away the negative relation
between before-fee performance and fees. Our regression analysis shows that, controlling for those
cost determinants, funds with lower expected performance and funds with less elastic demands
charge higher fees.
In the process of obtaining our results, we bring together three different strands of research:
the empirical investigation of fund performance, the analysis of fund flows, and the study of the
determinants of fund fees. Although there exist performance studies that look at the effect of funds’
expenses, and fee studies that include performance as a regressor, the main contribution of this
paper is to provide a thorough examination of the puzzling relation between the two variables.
Our results have important consequences both for investors and for regulators. For the former,
they provide further evidence that high fund fees do not generally pay for commensurately high
risk-adjusted returns. On the contrary, high fees may be a signal of poor performance. The
implications for regulators are wide-reaching. First, we provide further evidence that a significant
fraction of mutual fund investors is insensitive to fund fees and after-fee performance, in line with
the results of some recent studies (e.g., Gruber, 1996; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Elton et al., 2004)
and existing survey and experimental evidence on mutual fund investors’ behavior (Capon et. al.,
1996; Alexander et. al., 1997; Choi et. al., 2006). At least for the last decade of our sample, this
lack of performance-sensitivity coexists with easily available public information about funds’ fees
and performance, and with an increasing recognition by the financial press of the fact that fund
fees do not generally buy higher returns.27 Therefore, our results argue for the design of mutual
fund disclosure requirements that take into account the cognitive limitations of investors. They
also point out a potential drawback of the complete delegation of retirement investment decisions
to individual investors. Second, our results show that competition in the mutual fund market does
not guarantee that fund management services are adequately priced. On the contrary, there exists a
perverse negative relation between fund performance and the price of fund management that allows
underperforming funds to survive and that, thus, may also provide wrong incentives for entry.
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Data Appendix
A. Investment Objectives
The CRSP database offers different classifications of funds by investment objective. Unfortu-
nately, no classification covers the whole 1962-2003 period. To construct our sample, we therefore
had to combine the information provided by the different classifications. We considered a fund to
be a domestic diversified equity mutual fund if it satisfied any of the following conditions:
• For the years 1962-1989 a fund was included in the sample if the type of securities mainly held
by the fund was common stocks and the fund belonged to any of the following Wiesenberger
Objective codes: Growth, Growth-Income, Maximum Capital Gain.
• For the years 1990-1991, there is no information on the type of security mainly held by the
fund and the Wiesenberger classification changes. For these years, a fund was included in the
fund if it belonged to any of the following Wiesenberger Objective codes: Growth and Current
Income, Long-Term Growth, Maximum Capital Gains, or Small Capitalization Growth.
• For the years 1992-2003, a fund was included in the sample if it belonged to any of the
following Strategic Insight investment objective categories: Aggressive Growth, Growth Mid
Cap, Growth and Income, Growth, Small Company Growth.
B. Index Funds
We coded as index funds those whose name contained any of the following strings: Index, Idx,
Ix, Indx, NASDAQ, Nasdaq, Dow, Mkt, DJ, S&P, 500, BARRA. We checked the accuracy of our
variable using information for the year 2004 from Standard & Poors Fund Services (the information
was freely provided at Standard & Poors web site and retrieved July 14-15, 2004). The correlation
between our index dummy and Morningstar’ specialty code “index” is 0.72 and our dummy captures
70% of the observations coded as index by Morningstar (at the same time, 22% of the observations
coded by our dummy as index are not classified as such by Morningstar). Given the time lag (some
of the funds in our sample were not alive a year later) and the difference between the datasets,
we are confident that our dummy variable is capturing most index funds, without unnecessarily
excluding non-index funds.
33
C. Institutional Funds
We coded as institutional funds (or share classes) those funds whose name contained the strings
“Inst” or “inst” and those that belonged to share classes “Y” or “I”. We compared our coding for
the year 2003 with the one provided by Morningstar for the year 2004 (obtained from the MSN
Money webpage on July 14, 2004). Despite the one year difference, the correlation between the two
codings was 0.67; the percentage of the observations coded as institutional by Morningstar that
was also coded as such by our measure was 67% (at the same time, 22% of the observations coded
by our dummy as institutional were not classified as such by Morningstar).
D. Share Classes and Fund Complexes
In the CRSP dataset, different classes of the same fund appear as different funds without
a common fund identifier. Since funds with different classes are named “Fund’s name/Class,” we
performed a name search to identify fund-classes belonging to the same fund. The dataset, however,
does include an identifier of the company that manages the fund. We employ this identifier to
compute all variables related to fund complexes.
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Notes
1The literature on mutual fund performance is vast with first entries going back to Sharpe
(1966) and Jensen (1968). More recent entries to this literature include Malkiel (1995); Brown and
Goetzmann (1995); Gruber (1996); Carhart (1997); Daniel et al. (1997), Hendricks et al. (1993);
Elton et al. (1996); Wermers (2000); Cohen et al. (2005); Kacperczyk et al. (2005); Busse and
Irvine (2006); Kosowski et al. (2006).
2Fund expenses include the management fee paid to the fund management company. In Section
II, we describe the fees charged by mutual funds in greater detail.
3In 2005, U.S. households held about 20 percent of their assets—excluding real estate and other
property—in mutual funds, and nearly half of those households owned mutual funds (Investment
Company Institute, 2006).
4Recently, Berk and Green (2004) have provided a partial equilibrium model of the mutual fund
market that also requires that, in equilibrium, all funds’ risk-adjusted excess returns be zero.
5Some funds allow the percentage to depend on the fund’s performance. Our data does not
allow us to identify whether a fund charges a fixed or a variable (or incentive) fee. However, it
follows from the evidence reported in Elton et. al. (2003) that for most of our sample period, the
fraction of funds with incentive fees is very small. Therefore, we simply assume throughout the
paper that all funds charge fixed fees.
6Back-end loads (contingent deferred sales charges) are often computed as a fraction of the
minimum of the value of the shareholders initial investment and the value of the shareholders
investment at the time of redemption. Often, the percentage charged to the investor depends on
the time the investor has held the fund’s shares, and the sales charge may be waived if the investor
holds the shares for a long enough period. Mahoney (2004) provides a review of mutual fund fee
practices and regulation.
7About 0.8% of observations were identified as outliers.
8See the appendix for the procedure we followed to group fund-classes into funds.
9Wermers (2000), Kothari and Warner (2001), Kacperczyk et al. (2005) and Kosowsky et al.
(2006), are only a few recent examples of papers employing Carhart’s model to measure mutual
fund performance.
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10Kacperczyk et. al. (2005) and Kacperczyk and Seru (2006) have recently used the same
procedure.
11Since fund returns are reported after expenses, we add back annual expenses divided by 12 to
reported returns to retrieve monthly before-expense returns.
12Data were downloaded from Kenneth French’s website, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages
/faculty/ken.french/, on June 18, 2004.
13Standard errors obtained from a pooled OLS regression with a panel data set are biased down-
ward if residuals are serially correlated within a fund or cross-sectionally within a given period. In
addition to including a time dummy, we estimate standard errors clustered by period to correct for
these biases (Petersen, 2006). For our sample, standard errors computed in this way are substan-
tially higher than standard errors that do not account for cross-sectional correlation. For example,
the standard error reported in Panel A of Table II for the four-factor alpha is 0.3711, while the
OLS standard error for the same regression would be 0.1146, the White standard error 0.1236, the
standard error clustered by fund 0.1551, and the Newey-West standard error with 12 lags, which
corrects for serial correlation, 0.1389. The small difference between the OLS standard error and
those adjusted for serial correlation suggests that our approach is adequate for the dataset (see
Petersen, 2006). An alternative way to address the contemporaneous correlation in residuals is to
employ the Fama-MacBeth procedure (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). This procedure yields standard
errors that are close to ours (0.3586, with an estimated coefficient of -1.4792, and 0.2651 with a
coefficient of -1.074 if we weight by the number of observations in each month).
14For the sake of brevity, results are not reported in the paper, but they are available from the
authors upon request.
15The practice of incubation (see Evans, 2006), by which a management company starts several
funds with money raised internally and then terminates those funds with low returns and markets
those with high returns, may partially explain the omission bias, since management companies
“back-fill” the return information of the successful funds, while no information is compiled for the
terminated ones.
16In the original sample of diversified equity mutual funds (including observations with no in-
formation on returns or expenses), 15.5% of observations for funds with less than five years in
the sample (young funds) do not have data on returns or expenses (the corresponding percentage
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for seasoned funds is 5%). Further, the percentage of observations without enough information
among young funds becomes larger the earlier the period: if we consider the years 1963-1991, the
percentage goes up to 28.9% and it is almost 40% for the period 1963-1980.
17Sirri and Tufano (1998) are the first to assume a holding period of 7 years. This figure is based
on a redemption rate (measured as total outflows in a given year as a percentage of starting assets)
of 14% for aggressive growth, long-term growth and growth/income funds in 1990. Data from the
Investment Company Institute (2006, page 97) shows that the redemption rate in the 1985-2003
period has been on average 19.5%, implying a holding period of 5.13 years. During the same period,
the average redemption rate when outflows include the proceeds reinvested in a fund of the same
complex was 37.33%, implying a holding period of 2.67 years.
18The hypothesis that size and age are negatively related to fund fees has found empirical support
in the literature on the determinants of mutual fund fees. See, for instance, Ferris and Chance
(1987), Malhotra and McLeod (1997), Luo (2002), or Golec (2003). Recently, however, Chen et al.
(2004) have provided evidence that size and performance are negatively related. Their results cast
doubt on the potential explanation of our findings as caused by size differences.
19Henceforth, we focus on Carhart’s alpha exclusively. We use αit as a measure of the alpha
expected by the manager of fund i at the beginning of period t under the assumption that fees
are set at the beginning of period t. If fees were set in the middle of period t, our measure
of expected performance would thus aggregate performance observed prior to setting fees with
expected performance. We have estimated the fee equation using αit+1 as a measure of expected
returns and obtained identical results.
20Different aspects of mutual fund fee determination have been studied, among others by Ferris
and Chance (1987), Tufano and Sevick (1997), Latzko (1999), Malhotra and McLeod (1997), Luo
(2002), Deli (2002), and Golec (2003).
21Christoffersen and Musto (2002) do in fact refer to “price sensitivity”, rather than “performance
sensitivity”. For the money market funds that they study, however, they show that fee differences
are almost equivalent to net performance differences. In the context of equity funds, fee differences
account only partially for differences in net performance.
22Elton et al. (2001) report a number of errors associated with mutual fund mergers and splits
in the CRSP sample. Huang et al. (2006) argue that these errors could lead to extreme values of
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flows. We deal with this problem by eliminating the 1% of observations with the lowest and highest
flows in each year.
23In this case, we must first identify share classes of the same fund so a different class is not
counted as a different fund.
24We have also estimated equation (14) for holding periods of 2 and 10 years, obtaining similar
results.
25We have computed two measures of flow-to-performance sensitivity, each corresponding to a
different proxy for participation costs, and then conducted the subsequent analysis with both.
Given the similarity of results, we only report those corresponding to complex size as a proxy for
participation costs.
26In unreported results, we have found that Q/MAX does not have any significant effect on fund
fees if it replaces performance sensitivity in the fee equation, although the associated coefficient is
negative.
27Already in 1997, Money Magazine reports: “Over the past decade, the 20% of U.S. diversified
stock funds with the highest expenses charged an average of 1.85 % more in annual fees than the
cheapest 20%. But those priciest funds earned an annual average of 1.91 % less than the cheapest
group” (Brush, 1997).
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Tables
Table I
Summary Statistics. All funds
The table shows summary statistics for the whole sample of 538,813 fund-month observations. Reported
returns are monthly (after-fee) returns in percentage points. Expenses denotes funds’ expense ratio, and
loads the maximum of the front-end and back-end load. Both variables are measured in percentage points.
TNA is total net assets in millions of USD. Values of zero for TNA are due to rounding. Age is in years.
Mean Median S. D. Max Min
Returns 0.74 0.99 5.80 50.90 -49.62
Expenses 1.37 1.27 0.61 5.02 0.01
Loads 2.68 1.00 2.91 13.60 0.00
TNA 450.98 53.40 2,428.81 110,525.90 0.00
Age 8.89 5.00 11.62 80.00 0.00
Table II
Before-expense risk adjusted returns and expense ratios.
All funds
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ risk-adjusted before-expense
monthly returns on monthly expense ratios and dummy variables corresponding to each month in the period
January 1967-December 2003. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by
time to account for cross-sectional correlation. The total number of fund-month observations is 207,968.
One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Performance
Measure
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R2
Fama-French
3-factor -0.6257
∗ 0.3710 10.54%
Carhart
4-factor -1.0101
∗∗∗ 0.3715 10.26%
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Table III
Before-expense risk adjusted returns and expense ratios.
Actively managed retail mutual funds
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ risk-adjusted before-expense
monthly returns on monthly expense ratios and dummy variables corresponding to each month in the period
January 1967-December 2003. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by
time to account for cross-sectional correlation. The total number of fund-month observations is 181,111.
One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Performance
Measure
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R2
Fama-French
3-factor -0.6980
∗∗ 0.3235 10.53%
Carhart
4-factor -1.0240
∗∗∗ 0.3176 10.26%
Table IV
Before-expense risk adjusted returns and expense ratios.
No small funds
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ risk-adjusted before-expense
monthly returns on monthly expense ratios and dummy variables corresponding to each month in the period
January 1967-December 2003. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by
time to account for cross-sectional correlation. Fund-month observations with total net assets in the first,
second and third deciles of the corresponding month have been removed from the sample. Only actively
managed retail funds are included in the sample. One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Performance
Measure
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R2
Number
of Obs.
First Decile Excluded
Fama-French
3-factor -0.3253 0.4002 10.95% 163,505
Carhart
4-factor -0.9061
∗∗ 0.3888 10.57% 163,505
First and Second Deciles Excluded
Fama-French
3-factor -0.2193 0.4333 10.97% 145,658
Carhart
4-factor -0.9599
∗∗ 0.4150 10.59% 145,658
First, Second and Third Decile Excluded
Fama-French
3-factor -0.2506 0.4589 10.91% 127,859
Carhart
4-factor -1.0252
∗∗ 0.4390 10.54% 127,859
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Table V
Before-expense risk adjusted returns and expense ratios.
No-load funds
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ risk-adjusted before-expense
monthly returns on monthly expense ratios and dummy variables corresponding to each month in the period
January 1967-December 2003. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
by time to account for cross-sectional correlation. Only actively managed retail funds charging no front-
end load or contingent deferred sales load are included in the sample. The total number of fund-month
observations is 67,652. One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Performance
Measure
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R2
Fama-French
3-factor -0.5128 0.3367 8.84%
Carhart
4-factor -0.9966
∗∗∗ 0.3335 8.66%
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Table VI
Before-expense risk adjusted returns and total ownership cost.
Load funds
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ risk-adjusted before-expense
monthly returns on monthly total ownership cost and dummy variables corresponding to each month in the
period January 1967-December 2003. Total annual ownership cost is computed by adding annual expense
ratios to total loads divided by the holding period. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by time to account for cross-sectional correlation. Only actively managed retail funds
charging a front-end load or a contingent deferred sales load are included in the sample. The total number
of fund-month observations is 113,459. One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Performance
Measure
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R2
Holding period = 2 years
Fama-French
3-factor -0.3741
∗∗∗ 0.1354 11.77%
Carhart
4-factor -0.4302
∗∗∗ 0.1284 11.42%
Holding period = 7 years
Fama-French
3-factor -0.7205
∗ 0.3722 11.77%
Carhart
4-factor -0.9851
∗∗∗ 0.3512 11.43%
Holding period = 10 years
Fama-French
3-factor -0.6998
∗ 0.3925 11.77%
Carhart
4-factor -0.9898
∗∗∗ 0.3717 11.43%
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Table VII
Before-expense risk adjusted returns and expenses.
Regressions by subperiods
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ risk-adjusted before-expense
monthly returns on annual expenses and dummy variables corresponding to each month in the period January
1967-December 2003. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by time to
account for cross-sectional correlation. Only actively managed retail funds are included in the sample. One,
two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Performance
Measure
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R2
Number
of Obs.
Subperiod 1967-1976
Fama-French
3-factor 0.5063 0.61590 14.71% 27,202
Carhart
4-factor -0.4209 0.54970 12.50% 27,202
Subperiod 1977-1985
Fama-French
3-factor -0.0716 0.7684 8.23% 21,144
Carhart
4-factor -1.3395
∗∗ 0.6570 8.16% 21,144
Subperiod 1986-1994
Fama-French
3-factor -0.7167
∗∗ 0.3268 6.46% 28,832
Carhart
4-factor -1.0184
∗∗∗ 0.3093 5.96% 28,832
Subperiod 1995-2003
Fama-French
3-factor -0.9450
∗∗ 0.4693 10.64% 103,933
Carhart
4-factor -1.0804
∗∗ 0.4668 10.68% 103,933
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Table VIII
Before-expense risk adjusted returns and expenses.
Regressions by investment objective
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ risk-adjusted before-expense
monthly returns on monthly expenses and dummy variables corresponding to each month in the period
January 1992-December 2003. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by
time to account for cross-sectional correlation. Only actively managed retail funds are included in the sample.
One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Performance
Measure
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R2
Number
of Obs.
Strategic Insight: Aggressive Growth Funds
Fama-French
3-factor -1.8788
∗∗ 0.8198 18.02% 9,837
Carhart
4-factor -1.6644
∗∗ 0.8107 18.79% 9,837
Strategic Insight: Growth MidCap Funds
Fama-French
3-factor -1.4858 1.0535 27.64% 9,478
Carhart
4-factor -0.1146 0.9263 28.62% 9,478
Strategic Insight: Growth and Income Funds
Fama-French
3-factor -0.5763
∗∗∗ 0.2209 18.00% 29,134
Carhart
4-factor -0.8118
∗∗∗ 0.2343 18.61% 29,134
Strategic Insight: Growth Funds
Fama-French
3-factor -1.2230
∗∗∗ 0.3584 7.11% 50,349
Carhart
4-factor -1.0646
∗∗∗ 0.3461 7.19% 50,349
Strategic Insight: Small Company Growth Funds
Fama-French
3-factor -0.4765 0.5309 28.43% 23,275
Carhart
4-factor -0.7519 0.5326 24.93% 23,275
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Table IX
Fund flows and the flow-to-performance sensitivity
The table shows estimated coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ annual relative growth in assets due
to new money on selected fund characteristics in the period January 1992-December 2003. The measure of
performance is Carhart’s (1997) four-factor alpha in excess of the mean for all funds in the same investment
category and year. The table also reports heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered
by time to account for cross-sectional correlation. All fees are expressed in per-unit terms. The total number
of fund-year observations is 6,708. One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Proxy for participation costs
Total size of funds
in complex
Presence of a star
in complex
sizet−1
-0.0281∗∗∗
(0.0056)
-0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0058)
aget−1
-0.0337∗∗∗
(0.0057)
-0.0339∗∗∗
(0.0059)
FLoadt−1
-0.1290
(0.5491)
-0.1420
(0.5629)
BLoadt−1
0.1009
(0.8189)
0.0852
(0.8058)
Mfeet−1
-0.3856
(1.6876)
-0.5338
(1.5829)
12b1t−1
-4.7736∗∗
(2.0348)
-4.6017∗∗
(2.0444)
classAt−1
0.0270
(0.0280)
0.0279
(0.0308)
classBt−1
-0.0740
(0.0534)
-0.0738
(0.0529)
classCt−1
0.0621∗
(0.0363)
0.0623∗
(0.0371)
σt−1
-0.3154
(0.2308)
-0.3042
(0.2160)
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Table IX– Continued
Total size of funds
in complex
Presence of a star
in complex
size complext−1
0.0140∗∗∗
(0.0042)
0.0126∗∗
(0.0050)
flowt−1
0.0837∗∗
(0.0341)
0.0835∗∗
(0.0340)
objflowt−1
0.3505∗∗∗
(0.1271)
0.3516∗∗∗
(0.1238)
Q/Maxt−1
0.2586∗∗∗
(0.0594)
0.2546∗∗∗
(0.0596)
Perft−1
0.7404∗∗
(0.2907)
0.7567∗∗
(0.3050)
Perft−1·rel aget−1 -0.2268
∗∗
(0.1152)
-0.2601∗
(0.1356)
Perft−1·rel Q/MAXt−1 1.0516
∗∗∗
(0.2051)
0.9012∗∗∗
(0.2425)
IH,t−1
0.0650∗∗∗
(0.0250)
0.0528∗
(0.0299)
Perft−1·IH,t−1 0.7873
∗∗∗
(0.1641)
1.3202∗∗∗
(0.3166)
PCt−1·IH,t−1 0.0023(0.0062)
0.0211
(0.0221)
Perft−1·PCt−1·IH,t−1 -0.1339
∗∗∗
(0.0441)
-0.8269∗∗∗
(0.3070)
Adjusted R2 12.42% 12.36%
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Table X
Determinants of total ownership cost and management fees
The table shows estimated coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ fees on selected fund characteristics
in the period January 1992-December 2003. In columns (1)-(2), the dependent variable is total annual
ownership cost. This cost is computed for all funds, except those of class B or C, by adding total loads
divided by a holding period of 7 years to annual expense ratios. For class-B or -C funds, back-end loads
are subtracted from total loads. The dependent variable in column (3) is management fees defined as the
difference between the expense ratio and the 12b-1 fee. All fees are expressed in bp. The table also reports
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by time to account for cross-sectional
correlation. α̂t is the year t’s 4-factor alpha. The total number of fund-year observations is 8829, 6675, and
6378 for columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
sizet−1
-9.5024∗∗∗
(1.1888)
-13.4112∗∗∗
(2.7120)
-7.4601∗∗∗
(2.0775)
size2t−1
0.2293∗∗
(0.1061)
0.58498∗∗∗
(0.2129)
0.2937∗∗
(0.1480)
aget−1
-3.3418∗∗∗
(0.9238)
-6.9389∗∗∗
(0.6780)
-5.8075∗∗∗
(.72267)
size complext−1
-5.3533∗∗∗
(1.1635)
-4.5914∗∗∗
(1.2498)
-13.4956∗∗∗
(0.4742)
size complex2t−1
0.15723∗∗
(0.0662)
0.07020
(.08421)
0.4751∗∗∗
(0.03397)
n complext−1
-0.08226∗∗∗
(0.0308)
-0.14013∗∗∗
(.03878)
0.09984∗∗∗
(0.3104)
turnt−1
3.9733∗∗∗
(0.4299)
4.2772∗∗∗
(.70323)
3.7286∗∗∗
(0.7030)
σt−1
35.6745∗∗∗
(12.4637)
30.4614∗∗∗
(8.6865)
12.1905∗∗∗
(8.0574)
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Table X– Continued
GMCt−1
-10.1372∗∗∗
(1.3860)
-8.6189∗∗∗
(1.6625)
-11.9669∗∗∗
(0.9400)
GRIt−1
-16.6996∗∗∗
(1.2606)
-14.9580∗∗∗
(1.2300)
-19.4193∗∗∗
(0.85473)
GROt−1
-9.8955∗∗∗
(1.0104)
-8.9809∗∗∗
(1.4889)
-11.7772∗∗∗
(1.1546)
SCGt−1
-4.0166∗∗∗
(1.0274)
-3.7789∗∗
(1.6308)
-4.3689∗∗∗
(0.8291)
Load single− classt−1 74.8849
∗∗∗
(1.6098)
74.7276∗∗∗
(2.1866)
-1.6398
(1.4505)
classAt−1
92.2276∗∗∗
(1.1110)
92.8206∗∗∗
(1.2121)
4.1427∗∗∗
(0.6261)
classBt−1
85.9762∗∗∗
(1.7369)
84.3982∗∗∗
(2.1803)
3.4888
(2.2649)
classCt−1
80.1799∗∗∗
(3.2813)
78.8592∗∗∗
(4.0051)
0.6761
(3.2667)
α̂t
-9.9144∗∗
(4.6003)
-12.7013∗∗∗
(4.1554)
-13.0515∗∗∗
(4.0220)
Sˆt−1
-6.7943∗∗∗
(1.10640)
-6.45312∗∗∗
(1.0538)
Adjusted R2 65.17% 67.54% 43.84%
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Figure 1
Mutual fund expenses and loads
The figure shows yearly averages of mutual fund expenses (solid line) and loads (dashed line) for the 1962-
2003 period. It also displays yearly averages of loads among funds charging positive loads (dotted line).
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Figure 2
Total Net Assets
The figure shows yearly averages of the total net assets (measured in billions of USD.) managed by the
mutual funds in the sample.
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Figure 3
Number of funds
The figure shows yearly averages of the number of funds in the sample. The dashed line counts each fund-
class as an individual fund (as reported in the dataset). The solid line aggregates the different classes of a
single fund into one fund, and counts the number of these funds. The two lines coincide until year 1991.
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